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Building an Antenna for Tacit Knowledge
Harry Collins
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Wales (UK)
Résumé : Mon livre, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, est introduit. L’introduction
est également utile pour m’expliquer le livre à moi-même, l’auteur.
Abstract: My book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, is introduced. The intro-
duction is also helpful in explaining the book to me, the author.
1 Introduction: The problem
I will try here to make the ideas in my book Tacit and Explicit Knowledge
[Collins 2010], which I will refer to hereafter as “TEK”, more readily acces-
sible.1 I am not going to write a summary but to try to explain the book
to myself while “speaking aloud” as it were. Sometimes arguments and ideas
become clearer, even to their author, when they are explained for a second or
third time and I believe I am still finding out things about the book, especially
the first part.
I have spent a large part of my academic life investigating the area of
physics known as gravitational wave detection. The founder of the field was
an electrical engineer and introduced the term “antenna” to describe the de-
tectors. Like radio aerials, the detectors were meant to capture the vestigial
influence of some otherwise invisible field and make its properties palpable.
In the early days these antennae were metal cylinders on rubber mounts sur-
rounded by liquid gases in pipes. The modest physicist who built the most
Philosophia Scientiæ, 17 (3), 2013, 25–39.
1. This introduction takes off from my “Three Kinds of Tacit Knowledge”, which
was commissioned as an introduction to Tacit and Explicit Knowledge for a German
audience. It was published as [Collins 2012]. In re-writing the piece for this volume I
have made so many additions, changes and reorganisations that, though the overall
framing of the piece remains the same, it merits a new title. To save confusion for
readers who might encounter both versions, I have indicated many of the substan-
tive changes with footnotes. I thank the editors of this volume for triggering the
transformation of the piece.
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reliable of these early machines often told me that the esoteric nature of grav-
itational waves did not concern him; he was “just a plumber”. I think that
description fits me and TEK. TEK is an antenna built to capture and make
palpable aspects of the mysterious tacit knowledge and I am just the plumber,
albeit working with words and concepts, not metal and rubber. What we
are both trying to do is make a machine that can enable us to catch a
glimpse something ephemeral.2
TEK, I now realise, is based on a crude metaphor. Knowledge is a kind of
“stuff” which you either have or do not have. If you have it you can do certain
things, or understand certain things which you could not do or understand
before; you are also enabled to make good judgments in respect of those things.
For example, before you had some knowledge you could not build a working
TEA-laser;3 once you have the knowledge you can build a working TEA-
laser [Collins 1974]; [Collins 1985/1992]; before you had some knowledge you
could not make good judgments about whether an interferometer would be
able to detect gravitational waves with certain waveforms; once you have the
knowledge you can make such judgements [Collins & Evans 2007]; [Giles 2006].
A critic might say that the idea that there is some “stuff” that is passed
along is redundant—at one time you cannot build lasers and make judgements
about interferometers and at another time you can and that is all there is to
it; no “stuff” is involved—after all, you cannot see or smell the “stuff” so it
is an “idle wheel”. The response is that physical metaphors are still as useful
as they have been through the history of physics: you can’t see, or smell,
gravity or magnetic lines of force (or even, as Hume pointed out, causes in
general) but they are still useful hooks on which to hang your thinking.4 The
“knowledge-stuff” metaphor is an especially useful hook in two ways: one can
ask about the kinds of knowledge that exist and, noting that certain machines
and devices and certain animals and plants can do the things that humans
learn to do only by being infected by knowledge, one is forced to ask whether
what the non-humans have is the same knowledge-stuff as the humans have
or, if not, why not and what is the difference.
Secondly, knowledge-stuff is divided into two kinds: there is “explicit
knowledge-stuff” and there is “tacit knowledge-stuff”. It is tempting to say
that you can see and smell explicit knowledge. It is tempting to say that this
published paper is explicit knowledge and you can see it, smell it, and carry
it around. None of this is quite true because the books and papers are not
themselves explicit knowledge. They are, rather, the means by which explicit
knowledge is transmitted. They are like the germs which cause a disease rather
than being the disease itself. But at least you can see and smell the germs
2. The antenna metaphor and this entire paragraph are new. I will probably
include the antenna metaphor should there ever be a second edition of TEK.
3. TEA-laser stands for “Transversely Excited Atmospheric pressure carbon diox-
ide laser”. This was a kind of very powerful gas laser that was invented in the late
1960s and was very difficult to reproduce—at least at first.
4. None of this is spelled out in the book so I am already understanding it better.
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when explicit knowledge is involved.5 But in the case of tacit knowledge you
can’t see the germs—not being able to capture the means of transmission of
knowledge is what causes us to think of it as tacit knowledge. Where I argue
in TEK that certain kinds of tacit knowledge can be made explicit, what I
am doing is revealing how its transmission can be made visible and/or its im-
plementation handled. Thus the most important difference between tacit and
explicit knowledge is that explicit knowledge can be deliberately brought into
existence at distant locations—the germs can be isolated and sent through the
post or some such—while the germs of knowledge that is tacit cannot be sent
around in this way because they cannot be seen or captured. Tacit knowledge
is like a disease with invisible or as yet undiscovered germs; you cannot infect
people through the post but it can be “caught” by those around you.
Thus we know of only one way to acquire tacit knowledge and that is
to hang around with others who already have it.6 Explicating tacit knowl-
edge is showing how it can be passed on in ways other than hanging about.
The process which passes tacit knowledge around, so long as it has not been
explicated—so long as the germs have not been made visible—is called “so-
cialisation”. If I want to acquire the tacit knowledge pertaining to group “X”
I need to spend time in their company interacting with them as much as pos-
sible; that way I increase my chances of catching their knowledge-disease. It
is the way one learns to become fluent in a foreign language.
One can immediately see that the difference between tacit and explicit
knowledge has enormous economic importance. Explicit knowledge is cheap
to spread around—you can “broadcast” it and lots of people can buy it or get
it for nothing. Tacit knowledge is much harder to distribute because to pass it
on everyone has to be in the same location for a period. This means building
schools and universities, laboratories, arranging for apprenticeships and so
on—creating institutions in which people are brought together so they can
catch knowledge-diseases off other people.7 Businesses, if they want to steal
tacit knowledge from other businesses, have to capture some of the people from
the other business so they can hang around and infect everyone; it is often
5. In the original I talked of the transmission of explicit knowledge rather than the
transmission of the means to engender explicit knowledge. I apologise to readers of
my work for sometimes referring loosely to speech, writing, and so forth, as explicit
knowledge rather than as the means of transmitting explicit knowledge. I don’t think
any serious conceptual problems have resulted from this loose talk but corrections
need to be made when exactness is an issue.
6. The steadily increasing “bandwidth” of the internet makes it tempting to think
that one can “hang around” with people just by interacting with them electronically—
hence the popularity of the idea of distance-learning and the like. But this is a mistake
recognised by all those who are serious about communicating—we still have univer-
sities and schools and the airways are still clogged with businessmen and academics
travelling to meet their colleagues.
7. Ordinary diseases spread through distributed societies pretty fast but the tacit
knowledge disease is caught very slowly so the institutions that keep groups together
for a long time are necessary.
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cheaper and easier to buy the entire business along with the workers’ tacit
knowledge. Unsurprisingly, then, there is a lot of discussion about how and
whether tacit knowledge can be converted into explicit knowledge. There are
books in the management literature that claim to show how it is to be done.8
The question is also important to those who want to put human knowledge
into machines—first it has to be captured in symbolic, that is explicit, form.
As I will explain below, the answer to the question of whether tacit knowledge
can be turned into explicit knowledge is that a little of it can, some of it can
be converted in principle but not in practice, and a good bit of it cannot be
converted in any way we can think of.
It was said above that if you have new knowledge you can do or understand
new things. So suppose I enter the Amazon jungle, find an isolated tribe, and
give them a copy of this paper. They won’t be able to do or understand new
things—at least, not by using the written content of the paper—they won’t
catch the disease. So it was an oversimplification to say that explicit knowl-
edge can be “broadcast”. Explicit knowledge can be broadcast but only if the
circumstances are right—the receivers of the knowledge have to be receptive
to the infection.9
The detail of how it is that sometimes the transmission of explicit knowl-
edge works and sometimes it does not is complicated but something general
can be said at the outset. Where humans are involved, the receivers of explicit
knowledge have to be fluent in the language of the transmission medium and
fluency in language is acquired as tacit knowledge. This is one reason why
Polanyi was right when he said: “[...] all knowledge is either tacit or rooted
in tacit knowledge. A wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable” [Grene 1969,
144]. Explicit knowledge is a lot more complicated than it looks at first sight.
2 The explicit and explication
Thought about more deeply, it is the fact that there can be explicit knowledge
that is really difficult to understand.10 Thought about more deeply, there is
nothing hard to understand about tacit knowledge. Since the creation of the
first life forms, things have being doing things without being able to make
8. Methods of converting tacit knowledge tend to deal with tiny areas of the
problem with no grasp of how little it is that is being accomplished.
9. This context-boundedness creates a terrible mess exemplified by literature on
semiotics which really struggles to work out what is a sign, what is an icon and so
forth because the meanings of those terms are always shifting with context. I try to
start from more basic elements, not signs or icons with their inherent implication of
meaning, but with marks and patterns that might or might not be meaningful.
10. A vast amount has been written about how messages become “distorted”, how
“the author is dead” and how meanings are “socially constructed” but here we are
dealing with a different subject—the fact that sometimes a message does empower
its receiver in roughly the ways one might expect.
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explicit how it is they do them. Thus trees grow leaves and cats hunt mice
without being able to explain how they do it and without being able to pass
on those abilities in symbolic form. Likewise, we do not think it mysterious
that we humans can pump blood round our bodies without being told how
to do it nor learn to walk and speak without following a rule-book. What is
exceptional is that sometime humans acquired the ability to talk about some
of the things they could do and pass on these abilities by transferring materials
with patterns on them. In the book I call such materials “strings”.
By the middle of the Twentieth Century, probably because of the optimism
associated with the early computers, people thought it so normal to be able to
represent and transmit abilities via strings that they had to invent a special
term associated with abilities that could not be so transmitted. This term was
“tacit knowledge”. Because all human abilities were talked of as manifestations
of knowledge it was taken that those abilities that could not be passed around
in the form of strings were manifestations of tacit knowledge. Remarkably,
tacit knowledge—not being able to represent what you could do with strings—
came to seem to be something extraordinary and mysterious rather than the
perfectly ordinary state of affairs.
But it is explicit knowledge that is the astonishing thing. Material things,
such as vibrations in the air or marks on paper, pass around and, as a re-
sult, people can do or understand new things; there seems to be no causal
relationship between the material scraps that are passed around and the abil-
ities and understanding that they induce. There was never anything like this
in the universe before the invention of language—the real “big bang”. The
opening of Stanley Kubrik’s film, 2001: A Space Odyssey, shows early humans
transformed into tool-users by coming into contact with a mysterious black
obelisk. The development of the ability to use scraps of material to transmit
knowledge and understanding should be thought about in grand terms like
this; there must have been some equivalent of the black obelisk that made it
possible for those strange scraps of material that I call strings to have such
remarkable effects.11
Chapters 1-3 of my book and some of the Introduction are about explicit
knowledge—how people pass on knowledge by passing around materials car-
rying patterns—strings. The term “string” has been used in other discourses,
such as that of computer programming and, of course, physicists’ “string the-
ory”.12 To save confusion I would probably have been better off inventing a
new word such as “grom”. A string, as it is used here, is about as meaningless
as a “grom”. A string is simply any material thing made of anything that is
not completely plain or random. Vibrations in the air are strings, patterns
of dirt on rocks are strings, and printed words are strings. The very non-
specificity of the notion of string is important as it helps with understanding
11. This paragraph is entirely new to this publication—I will include the sentiment
should there ever be a new edition of TEK.
12. This passage is new to this version of the paper.
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how strange the transmission of explicit knowledge is. It can be done with
any material thing provided the conditions are right. The notion of “symbol”
is far too confusing—a symbol is a string in the right circumstances. To ask
the deep question about what are the circumstances that enable some scrap
of material to act as a symbol you have to start with these essentially mean-
ingless strings and struggle to work out how it is that sometimes they appear
to convey meaning.
String transformations are fundamental to understanding how the world
works. All languages, including purely spoken languages, have to be repre-
sented in some approximate way by strings. But languages are not strings.
Strings are meaningless—just bits of stuff—whereas languages are meaningful.
Using languages involves lots of string transformations so string transforma-
tion can easily be confused with language. In spoken language, for example, a
set of mouth, throat and chest movements is transformed into a set of vibra-
tions in the air, which are transformed into movements of the ear, which are
transformed into a set of electric currents and so on. Usually the elements of
the transformation process are transient; Edison invented a way to transform
some usually temporary strings into more permanent strings.13
Strings carry “information” not meaning. The information that they carry
has to do with the number and arrangement of their components. This is
what “information theory” is all about. “Information theory” can tell you
how to remedy losses in information transmission or at least how to measure
them. It is because strings are without meaning that “information theory” is
a success; there can be no comparable “meaning theory”. There can be no
equally successful meaning theory because while information is a property of
strings, meanings are a property of the societies in which languages live and
continually evolve.
In spite of having written three chapters in TEK about the relationship
between language and strings and the way knowledge is passed on using strings
I do not understand how it works. All I manage to explain in TEK is some of
the differences between occasions when knowledge transmission using strings
does work and occasions when it does not work—I describe some of the “solu-
tions” that can turn a failed attempt to transmit knowledge using strings into
a successful attempt to transmit knowledge using strings. This does not solve
the deep problem of explicit knowledge—I still do not understand the mech-
anism of those successes—I can only explain why the successes work better
than the failures. But this does allow one to describe the process of explication
even if it does not explain how there can be “an explicit” in the first place.
Tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot be explicated or is not
explicated—it is not or cannot be passed on using strings. Some of it may
be passable by using strings in the future and some of it may be passable
using strings in other places. A lot of what is thought to be irredeemably
tacit can be explicated once we work out how and in other places it may
13. Are the indentations on a gramophone record symbols? They are strings.
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not seem so irredeemable. If it is the case that tacit knowledge is knowledge
that cannot be explicated then there are as many kinds of tacit knowledge as
there are reasons that stop it becoming explicated. There are three kinds of
reasons why tacit knowledge cannot be explicated so there are three kinds of
tacit knowledge.
We still have to know a bit more about what “explicated” means. I argue
in Chapters 1-3 of TEK that explicated can mean four things. One can be
illustrated very simply. Somewhere in the text that you have read is a full-stop
and printed within that full-stop in microscopic lettering is a message that is
important to you and will empower you in certain ways. The full stop is what
spies call a “microdot”. You did “see” that full-stop but it had no impact on
you. Now, so long as the context is right, we can render the message in that
full-stop explicit by physically transforming it. If we simply transform the full-
stop and its message into something much larger, what was not explicit will
become explicit and may now have the desired empowering effect upon you.
If you knew where the full stop was and you had a powerful magnifying glass
you could transform the string into something that could convey meaning to
a fluent English speaker. You would see: “Drinking coffee makes your hair fall
out”. This is an example of explication by physical transformation of a string.
That simple example explains a lot. When I push a CD into my com-
puter’s drive and some words, or pictures, come up on the screen, physical
transformation is what is going on. We say the computer is “reading” the
disk but actually it is taking the marks on the CD, which you can’t read, and
transforming them into marks you can read—just like looking at the full-stop
through a magnifying glass; the computer is a kind of complicated magnifying
glass. Both computers and magnifying glasses do physical transformations on
strings. String transformation is the only thing that computers and magnifying
glasses do.
Another kind of “explicating” is exemplified in TEK with an old joke about
people who regularly go to a certain pub (sometimes it is the long-term inmates
of a prison), who tell each other jokes by just shouting out numbers. Each
number refers to a joke that everyone in the pub (or prison) already knows.
For the rest of us the same joke has to be explained at full length if we are
to understand it. The pub or prison situation is sometimes reproduced in
ordinary life when long-standing members of bureaucratic organisation talk
almost entirely in acronyms which outsiders cannot understand [TEK, 22–23].
The point is that sometimes a short string will have no knowledge-inducing
effect but a longer string can induce the knowledge. Lengthening a string is
the second kind of explication.
There are two other ways in which strings are transformed to the point
they can be interpreted and which seem to fit into the way we use our lan-
guage as examples of things being made explicit. The first of these is when
we transform some causal/behavioural sequence that we can accomplish with-
out knowing how, into the form of some artefact we have created, such as a
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machine. A machine is a permanent string that produces temporary strings.
(One should begin to see that the definition of string is so broad that it en-
compasses causal sequences and artefacts as well as patterns—the point is that
causal sequences and artefacts are patterns.) Thus, when we make a machine
that roughly reproduces some activity of ours that we are trying to understand
(like balancing on a bike or playing chess), we can say that the working of the
activity has been made explicit. For example, many people now think they un-
derstand chess because grand-master chess-playing machines have been built.
Others say that these machines do not play chess like humans so human chess-
playing has not been understood. We do not need to settle this argument to
see that if the machines had reproduced human-like chess we would no longer
say that chess always depends on tacit knowledge. Therefore humans’ ability
to play chess must have been explicated. The point is that the workings of
the machine and the behaviour of the machine can be readily interpreted: the
machine is a string that can be easily interpreted by (certain) humans (that
is, in this case, those who live in Western societies rather than the Amazon
jungle)—it is, therefore, properly referred to as explicated knowledge.
The final way of talking about explication is closely related: it is when
some sequence has been represented in the language of science—some set of
equations or words—a string—which can be interpreted as explaining how
something works. These four meanings of explicable are set out in Table 1,
which is a reproduction of Table 4 on page 81 of TEK.
1. Explicable by
elaboration




Physical transformation of strings enhances
their causal effect and affordance
3. Explicable as
mechanisation
A string is transformed into mechanical causes
and effects that mimic human action
4. Explicable as
explanation
Mechanical causes and effects are transformed
into strings called scientific explanations
Table 1: Four meanings of explicable
3 The tacit
So now I think I begin to see even better what is in my book. I make no attempt
in TEK to explain why it is possible that certain things can be interpreted
meaningfully by humans. It is just assumed that there are some things that
mean something in one place and another thing in other places and sometimes
things that are meaningful in one place have no meaning in others; the only
question is why those meaningful things sometimes can, and sometimes cannot,
be transmitted via strings.
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Having set the problem up in this way we can get to the heart of the matter.
The heart of the matter is found in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of TEK. Ironically,
the difficult part of the book is finding a way to understand the question
and setting it up so that it is possible to answer it. That was the process
of designing the tacit-knowledge antenna. Answering the question—using the
antenna—is a comparatively straightforward business. There are three kinds of
reason why meaningful knowledge is not, or cannot be, transmitted by strings
and this means there are three kinds of tacit knowledge. It remains only to set
out the three kinds of tacit knowledge: they are Relational Tacit Knowledge,
for which I will use the acronym, RTK, Somatic Tacit Knowledge (STK) and
Collective Tacit Knowledge (CTK). These three kinds can also be thought of
as “weak”, “medium” and “strong” tacit knowledge.
3.1 Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK)
Relational Tacit Knowledge is a ragbag category but the simplest of all once
one has the idea. In RTK knowledge is tacit, for the time being, because social
‘r’elations are what they are. Change the social relations between people and
what was once tacit can become explicit.
“Secrets” are an everyday example of RTK. Because their social relations
can be competitive, scientists sometimes do not transmit strings to others even
though they know they will be meaningful and empowering. A more subtle
element of RTK is “mismatched salience”. In that case the “transmitter” has
an incorrect model of the “receiver’s” knowledge and does not realise that
some piece of information that seems perfectly obvious to the one party is not
obvious to the other so it does not occur even to try and transmit it as a string;
likewise, the receiver does not know what to ask. Closer social relations can
resolve the problem.
Thirdly, there is knowledge that one party is unaware of possessing. The
classic case concerns the position of the capacitor in the early days of the
construction of the TEA-laser, see note 3 [Collins 1985/1992]. Here success-
ful laser builders placed their heavy capacitors in the awkward “traditional”
position—elevated and inverted—whereas those working from circuit diagrams
would more likely place them on the bench, in which case the laser would not
work. It was only later that the successful laser builders realised that the awk-
ward positioning was essential because it shortened the top lead and lowered
its inductance. So, in the early days the successful laser-builders could not
have constructed the relevant empowering string however much they wanted
to; later they could. Here the idea that the knowledge is tacit in consequence
of social relations is strained but we can still find an excuse to use the ‘R’
in RTK by saying that new ideas are in-part expressed by changing social
relations among scientists.14
14. “The social relations between men and the ideas which men’s action embody
are really the same thing considered from different points of view [...]” [Winch 1958,
121].
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RTK includes things like secrets which it seems gratuitous to refer to as
anything as mysterious as tacit knowledge. A secret is something that is
perfectly explicable but someone chooses not to explicate to someone else—
why mystify it? RTK also includes things that are tacit for now but can
become explicit in time—for example as scientific knowledge increases. But
the category just about holds together as a species of tacit knowledge because
in every case the knowledge, whether it secret or just currently not understood,
can be passed on by “hanging around”—for example, hanging around successful
laser builders. Secrets can be revealed by just watching what is going on—by
spying; mismatched saliences will become matched, and traditional methods
of doing things will be passed on just by hanging around without anyone
realising their significance or even that it is happening. Hence RTK possesses
the crucial characteristic that it cannot be passed on by strings—at least, not
until or unless it becomes explicated—but it can be passed on through social
contact. This is what ties it to the other categories of tacit knowledge though
sometimes it seems a bit of a strain.
Note, that in principle there is nothing to stop every piece of RTK from
becoming explicit: secrets could be told; if one had a better model of the re-
cipients’ knowledge one could pass on bits of knowledge in the form of strings
that one had not initially realised needed to be passed on; and as more sci-
ence is done (category 4 of explicability) the importance of things like the
inductance of the top lead become clear enough to be expressed in strings.
Of course, this does not mean that all the elements of RTK can be told here
and now or even that all the elements can ever be explicated; what it means
is that any one element can be explicated given the will, the understanding
and the effort. That said, there will always be RTK because there will always
be secrets; we will never have complete knowledge of the contents of others’
heads; and science will never be finished. The continued existence of RTK is
more a matter of social relations and of logistics than of epistemology but, like
death and taxes, social relations and logistics are always with us.
3.2 Somatic Tacit Knowledge (STK)
Somatic Tacit Knowledge is tacit because it is stored in the arrangements of
the body. The classic case of STK is the ability to ride a bicycle—the case
discussed by Polanyi. As Polanyi famously said:
If I know how to ride a bicycle [...], this does not mean that I
can tell how I manage to keep my balance on a bicycle [...] I may
not have the slightest idea of how I do this, or even an entirely
wrong or grossly imperfect idea of it, and yet go on cycling [...]
merrily. Nor can it be said that I know how to bicycle [...] and yet
do not know how to co-ordinate the complex pattern of muscular
acts by which I do my cycling [...] I both know how to carry out
(this performance) as a whole and also know how to carry out the
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elementary acts which constitute (it), although I cannot tell what
these acts are. [Polanyi 1966, 4]
This is an iconic description of the meaning of tacit knowledge and it fits well
with much of the philosophy that has to do with the body. For example,
Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s “five stage” model of skill acquisition is to do with the
“internalisation” of skills such as car-driving: it is only novices who rely on
trying to follow explicit rules whereas true skills involve unconscious processes
of far greater complexity which cannot be captured by any set of rules [Dreyfus
& Dreyfus 1986]. True skills of this sort are embodied and not transformable
into strings. This view also fits well with that of philosophers such as Heidegger
and Merleau-Ponty.
And yet there is something badly wrong with Polanyi’s understanding of
bicycle-riding. One can begin to see why by looking only a couple of pages
further on in the source from which the above quotation is taken. Polanyi
also says:
[I]n order to compensate for a given angle of imbalance α we must
take a curve on the side of the imbalance, of which the radius (r)
should be proportionate to the square of the velocity (v) over the
imbalance r ∼ v2/α. [Polanyi 1966, 6–7]
In other words, Polanyi says there is a set of rules for bicycle riding—it is
just that we humans cannot follow them. To see what is being claimed here,
imagine the following: we are trying to ride a bicycle on the surface of a
small asteroid so that the pull of gravity is only a millionth of what it is on
Earth and the bike, when it becomes unbalanced, falls so slowly it is, as the
English expression goes, like watching paint dry. In such a case there would
be no reason why we might not carry a booklet with Polanyi’s instructions for
bike-riding and a few geometrical instruments and keep the bike balanced in
rather the same way as we currently assemble flat-pack furniture—by reference
forward and back to the instruction book while using a few tools. Now put the
bike back on Earth and imagine that our brains and bodies worked a million
times faster—then balancing on the bike would still be like balancing on the
asteroid; it would be possible to manage via explicit knowledge—interpreted
strings. So while Polanyi may be perfectly right about how we humans actually
balance on bikes, and it involves “somatic tacit knowledge”, it does not follow
that it is impossible to make this knowledge explicit and usable by different
kinds of creatures with faster processing and reaction times—and it should
come as no surprise that there are machines that can balance on bicycles. So
Polanyi himself has made the knowledge of bike-balancing explicable in the
sense of Table 1 category 4 and clever engineers have made it explicable in the
sense of category 3.
“Somatic limit tacit knowledge” is knowledge that remains tacit in use
solely because of the limited capabilities of human brains and bodies. I argue
in the book that all somatic tacit knowledge—which is the staple of the phe-
nomenological literature that is concerned with the body—is like this. It is
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much less mysterious than it has been made out to be and each bit of it could,
in principle, be rendered explicit in the way just demonstrated in respect of
the bicycle. The same goes for the abilities of cats, dogs, trees and sieves
though, as I show, the case of something as simple as a sieve sorting stones, it
can be extremely complicated actually to make some physical process explicit.
Here, however, the limit to the explicability of the knowledge is, again, not
epistemological, but a matter of the limits of our scientific abilities. Though
we would struggle to reproduce the sorting method of a sieve—which depends,
for example, on the exact shape of the stones, many coefficients of friction and
just how the sieve is shaken—a much more accomplished scientific race, for
whom the sieve problem would be trivial, might have explicated much of even
the STK of our bodies and brains. We humans, of course have to continue to
use this knowledge as tacit knowledge—something stored in the materials of
our bodies (and how we do this remains an interesting topic for analysis), but,
again, this is just a matter of how we happen to be constituted.
TEK also argues that certain elements of STK may never be explicable
in terms of category 3—that is, we may never be able to reproduce what we
do mechanically—because of the very properties of the physical materials of
which we are made. That is to reproduce us mechanically, the materials and
mechanism would have to be identical—so it would be like making a three-
dimensional photo-copy of us rather than reproducing in another form. That
is not explicating, only copying (though one might need to explicate in order
to understand what it would be to make an identical copy since there are an
indefinite number of dimensions of possible difference). When it is the case
that reproduction of the materials of the human body are essential to the
reproduction of the actions they can carry out I call it “somatic affordance
tacit knowledge”—it is the materials of body itself, or of the brain, which is
part of the body, that affords the possibility of the action in question.
3.3 Collective Tacit Knowledge (CTK)
Collective Tacit Knowledge is the most profound case. To see what it is we can
begin, once more, with Polanyi and the bicycle. What has been dealt with in
the last section is what can be called “bicycle-balancing”. It is all about how one
keeps the bike upright on the asteroid, on Earth, or whatever. But there is an
entirely different aspect of bicycle-balancing which Polanyi does not deal with
and for which there truly is no formula. This is bike-riding in traffic. Dreyfus
and Dreyfus do discuss car-driving in traffic but they do not seem to notice
the difference between this and controlling the car—the gears, the steering,
and so forth; for Dreyfus and Dreyfus there is no discontinuity between the
STK of the gear-shift and the very different kind of tacit knowledge needed to
drive “in social concert”.
To start to see the difference one can note that balancing on a bike, or
mechanically controlling a car, is the same process wherever it is executed
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whereas riding/driving in traffic is hugely different in different places and in
different circumstances. Riding my bike in Cardiff I know I can ride on the
pavement (sidewalk) without anyone bothering me—pedestrians will get out
of my way with a smile so long as I am polite. I noticed the same thing in
Tokyo recently. But there are other towns even the UK where it would be
unthinkable to ride your bike on the pavement. I know that in the UK I can
cross a road on my bike against a red light so long as I can “catch the eye” of
the drivers who are waiting to go as soon as the green light comes on in their
favour and they indicate their agreement with the tiniest acknowledgement.
But I also know that if I ride in the UK at night I would be well-advised to
have lights and that if I am driving my car I am entitled to be furious at any
bike-rider who does not have lights. In contrast, in Beijing bike riders ride
everywhere at night without lights and no-one gets furious. I notice that car-
drivers in China do things, like cutting corners, and driving on the wrong side
of the road, that would be unimaginable in Europe or America. But I notice
that you can do many more outrageous things in Italy when you drive a car
than you can in the UK and no-one gets angry [Collins 2004, 398–399].
So what I am doing here, so it seems, is providing strings that will enable
you to understand how to ride your bike or your car in different countries.
But this is misleading. First, my description of Chinese driving was of a few
years back—perhaps it has all changed. And which are those towns where you
can and can’t ride on the pavement? The recipe—the set of strings—is never
fixed and never predictable because it is the property of entire societies and
the way societies change is unpredictable. To know what the rule is I have
to go to the society and find out by being there—there is no rule about how
frequently and how fast the rules change. What can be done is to say “in that
frozen moment of past time, 2005, these were some rules for riding bikes in
those parts of Beijing that I visited”, but that does not tell you how to ride on
your next visit.
Much more important, I have provided no string for telling you how to
“catch the eye” of a car driver nor how to recognise whether the look they
return is an acknowledgement of the fact that they are not going to run me
over when I cross in front of them or not. And I cannot provide such strings.
Such things are only acquired through immersion in the society.
Riding-in-traffic has the same structure as language fluency. Fluency in
languages cannot be acquired from the most exhaustive study of dictionaries,
grammar books and guides to foreigners’ habits, it can only be acquired by
spending time in the language-speaking community. The way to think about
this kind of knowledge is as belonging to the collectivity, not the individual.
That is why it is called “Collective Tacit Knowledge”. Language is not under
anyone’s control—what happens in the whole community is what determines
what can be said and what cannot be said at this time and place while even
the rules for a complete description of a frozen moment are indefinitely long.
All this is true of every kind of collective tacit knowledge.
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What we as individuals do is borrow the knowledge of collectivities for a
short time. We borrow it in the typical way of catching tacit knowledge—
which is the typical way of catching diseases: we hang around with people
who already have the knowledge/disease. But if we stay away from the com-
munal “host” on which we are a “parasite” our disease will begin to mutate.
Our language will degrade and depart from the host language—it will become
archaic, or come to resemble a cargo-cult language that no longer reflects the
meanings of the same terms in the host. It is the same with all CTK. It is
only CTK which we can think of no way to explicate it in any of the four
senses of explicate—not even in principle. All we parasites can do, to change
the metaphor, is suck continually on our collective host’s CTK-blood.
4 Conclusion
The term tacit knowledge, as it is used in academia, applies to three very dif-
ferent things that are usually not distinguished. This is not surprising because
in most cases of the acquisition of tacit knowledge, all three kinds are being
acquired at the same time in a very confounded way. Because of this, all man-
ner of false claims have been made about the way the tacit can be turned into
the explicit or the tacit cannot be turned into the explicit. Only by keeping
the three types of tacit knowledge separate will we understand what is really
going on when knowledge is transferred.
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